T he relationship between science and valuesespecially as it concerns the development of conservation policy-has attracted interest among scientists in recent decades, as evidenced by a special issue of BioScience in June 2001 (see also Lach et al. 2003 ) and a special section of Conservation Biology in June 1996. The field of ecology provides an ideal area in which to examine this relationship, given the growth of its role in public policy since the late 1960s (Pouyat 1999) .
Contributions to this debate often center on the role of scientists in the development of conservation policy, framed as a dichotomy between the scientist as analyst (objective, value free) and as advocate (biased, value laden) . This distinction corresponds to the dominant view that science is objective, or value free (Rykiel 2001) , in contrast to the more subjective stance of policy (Franz 2001) . Other contributions have challenged the very existence of objective science (Costanza 2001) .
However, a number of ecologists (Schrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993 , Pickett et al. 1994 , Robertson and Hull 2001 have begun to explore alternative understandings of objectivity, suggesting that it depends on a view of science as an interactive, social activity in which multiple forms of reasoning and evidence, together with critical discussion, take place among a diverse scientific community. This recent work offers a more expansive view of how objectivity in science is defined and, in so doing, begins to move the discussion about science and advocacy beyond whether or not science is "value neutral."
In this article, we aim to further develop the understanding of scientific objectivity beyond the notion of a valuefree science. To do so, we report on a study of the reasoning used by eight ecologists as they considered current ecological thinking. The reasoning of these scientists provides insights into how they practice science. The forms of argument they used to relate theory to reality, and how they drew on professional and societal norms for support, are of central interest. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for conservation policy.
Contextual empiricism and rethinking objectivity
The public authority of science, and thus its ability to inform conservation policy, rests on its claims to objectivity (Tauber 1999) . As the basis of value-free science, objectivity derives from empiricism, with its assumptions that science uses a single mode of inquiry (based on testing theories using controlled observations and experiments) and is conducted by individual scientists detached from the object of inquiry. Anchored in these assumptions, objectivity depends fundamentally on the "integrity" of science, which is upheld when the internal practices of science (e.g., observation and experiment) are not influenced by subjective values (whether those of the scientist or of the social context in which science is practiced).
This empiricist view of objectivity has been challenged both historically and philosophically (Tauber 1999) . A number of the critical perspectives that challenge empiricism focus on the social character of scientific knowledge, a view emphasized by Popper (1969) and traceable at least as far back as John Stuart Mill (1859) . These scholars have argued that critical interaction between scientists is central to the validation of claims of knowledge. The achievement of knowledge is a social or collective matter, not an individual one.
In their explorations of ecological knowledge, Longino (1990) and Pickett and colleagues (1994) used the concept of "contextual empiricism" to provide a broader understanding of objectivity based on science as a social activity. This concept retains empirical evidence as a necessary standard in science, while modifying the empiricist assumptions by recognizing that (a) there are multiple modes of relating theory to reality and (b) science is a social activity conducted by a community of scientists who are situated in a wider societal context (Longino 1990) . The first of these elements of contextual empiricism can be described as the cognitive dimension and the second as the contextual (or social) dimension.
The cognitive dimension recognizes that scientists employ more than one mode of reasoning, relying on empirical, conceptual, and logical analyses to judge the fit between concepts and observable phenomena (Pickett et al. 1994) . These judgments are influenced by normative constraints such as truth, accuracy, predictive power, and scope (or generality). These constraints function as shared standards, which constitute values for judging the quality of results and conclusions; they are also a source of rules for scientific practice (Longino 1990 , Franz 2001 . Such shared standards make scientists responsible to something other than themselves, helping to minimize the influence of subjectivity in science.
The reliance of scientists on modes of reasoning other than empirical evidence has implications for the contribution of ecology to conservation policy. The expectations of policy for scientific knowledge based on empirical evidence are often unrealistic, because many environmental issues raise scientific questions for which empirical evidence is weak. This is because these issues are raised at the "frontiers of science," where core ecological concepts are often contested. When empirical evidence is inconclusive, scientific judgments based on conceptual and logical analyses can still inform policy, given that they are accepted modes of reasoning within the practice of ecology, as described by contextual empiricism.
The second element of contextual empiricism, the contextual (social) dimension, derives from interactions within a scientific community, as well as from the wider social context within which science is conducted. The interactions between scientists include repeating experiments and reexamining, restating, and reformulating theories and hypotheses before they are accepted as part of the scientific canon. This approach stems from an understanding of science as a nonauthoritarian system of inquiry that is inherently correctable. Correction is possible through the interactions among scientists. Longino (1990) and Pickett and colleagues (1994) identified such interactions, through which scientists modify and refine their science, as being essential for objectivity.
Within this second dimension, a number of the social norms of science have been put forward as helping to judge the objectivity of a scientific community (Longino 1990 ). Among these norms are shared standards that critics can invoke, recognized avenues for criticism (e.g., peer review), responsiveness to criticism in the scientific community as a whole, and willingness to share intellectual authority. These norms, although located within the contextual dimension, make it possible to maintain the shared cognitive standards within a scientific community. They enable scientists to reflect on the evidence for claims to knowledge, and thus to articulate, criticize, and defend the assumptions that bridge the gap between concepts and observable phenomena. These two dimensions of objectivity, the cognitive and the contextual, are clearly interrelated and overlapping.
The contextual dimension of contextual empiricism also has implications for the contributions of ecology to conservation policy. Policymakers can use the norms of science to assess the objectivity of scientific communities of interest. As Franz (2001) noted, given that science is conducted by a community of scientists,"the characteristics of the institutional arrangements that order the interactions among members of a scientific group can be used to judge the extent to which the group is involved in unbiased scholarship."
Research methods
To gather data on the forms of reasoning invoked by ecologists and on the social norms that guide their work, we surveyed a panel of ecologists using a three-round Delphi process (Ludlow 1975) . Delphi research has been designed to deal with complex issues by bringing together expert judgment (Ludlow 1975 , Crance 1987 , Hess and King 2002 . In a Delphi study, a small panel of experts are asked to comment individually on a set of questions or statements, and their feedback is then distributed anonymously to other panelists between question rounds (usually three) to elicit further input (Ludlow 1975) . Delphi research has been applied in a range of disciplines, including environmental science, marine tourism, ecosystem management, and conservation biology. Examples from conservation biology include Crance's (1987) work on habitat suitability and Hess and King's (2002) research to assist in selecting focal species.
The central purpose of this Delphi study was to access and describe convergences and divergences in contemporary thinking about ecology, by ecologists. One part of the results is reported in this paper-how panel members supported their own views and considered and addressed the views of others. The first round involved e-mailing a set of 12 statements to the panel members, which together provided a summary of current ecological thinking, and asking these scientists to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement, giving their reasons. The summary was produced through an extensive review of the literature, focusing on theoretical and applied work associated with nonequilibrium ecology (Wallington et al. 2005) . The second round involved sending the panel members the same 12 statements, revised on the basis of participants' comments in the first round. For each statement, the extent and nature of the panelists' agreement and disagreement and associated reasoning were also provided. Panelists were asked to reconsider their responses from round 1 on the basis of the other participants' responses. In the third round, we sought panelists' input on the first draft of a jointly authored paper exploring the convergence and divergence in current ecological thought, based on the statements and participants' responses. Until round 3, respondents remained anonymous to each other (Ludlow 1975) . The interactions between these panelists within the Delphi process provided readily accessible insights into the practice of science-the reasoning, judgments, and adjustments that characterize everyday scientific work.
A panel of eight ecologists completed this study, with the expertise and mix of participants being more important than the panel size (Crance 1987) . Nonprobability criterion sampling (Hasson et al. 2000) was used to ensure this mix. All the ecologists selected had international reputations in ecology, and the panel collectively included theoretical (three), empirical (two), and applied (three) scientists, and represented a number of countries and biomes of interest (e.g., forest, heath). The criterion for international reputation was based on extensive citation of the panelists' work in references found using the ISI Web of Knowledge cited reference search. All panel members can be generally described as community ecologists, with an active interest in conservation biology.
Contextual empiricism, as described by Longino (1990) and Pickett and colleagues (1994) , provided a structure for analyzing and reporting on the reasoning provided by the ecologists in their responses to rounds 1 and 2. Pattern matching, in which ideas, concepts, and ultimately patterns emerge from analysis of text and can be matched against preexisting theoretical concepts (such as those comprising contextual empiricism) or other emergent material, provided the methodological basis (Yin 1994) . Both authors of this article were involved in coding and recoding the material to improve reliability.
Cognition and different modes of reasoning
Three different ways of developing an argument or reasoning were evident from the Delphi responses: relying on empirical evidence, using conceptual criticism, and drawing on experience (table 1). All three methods, which were recognized by Longino (1990) , can be categorized as part of the cognitive dimension of contextual empiricism; they are cognitive norms, accepted ways of thinking and reasoning about and engaging with the work of others in ecology.
When panelists responded in terms of empirical evidence, they focused on its adequacy (Longino 1990 ), either as evidence from the field or as support for theoretical positions (table 1) . They also drew on conceptual criticism to support an argument or point of view. The importance of conceptual criticism has long been underappreciated in science, where empirical ideals have dominated (Longino 1990) . In contrast to empirical arguments, which focus on the data themselves, conceptual criticism centers on the assumptions behind data collection, analysis, and interpretation. In conceptual criticism, arguments must be justified on the basis of logical and conceptual analyses, rather than on descriptive or empirical grounds alone (Schrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993) . Panelists questioned the soundness of hypotheses; for example,"I don't agree that [a] species focus arises from the mechanistic approach of classical ecology" (table 1). They also gave their arguments weight by citing their consistency with accepted theory, as when one ecologist noted, "[My] argument flows from the intermediate disturbance principle" (table 1). These criticisms are conceptual rather than empirical because they are not questioning the evidence itself, but rather its relevance. Experience, the third mode of reasoning, was drawn on to enhance the credibility of the views given. Pragmatists have long recognized experience as fundamental to acquiring knowledge (Bernstein 1971 ).
Context and science as a social activity
The contextual dimension of objectivity derives from science as a social activity, with a focus on the associated social norms. Three groups of norms were evident from the responses throughout the Delphi inquiry: professional, paradigmatic, and societal ( Conceptual criticism "I don't agree that [a] species focus Grounded in theoretical concerns such as the arises from the mechanistic approach conceptual soundness of a hypothesis, its consisof classical ecology." tency with accepted theory, and the relevance of supporting evidence (Longino 1990 overlaps, the three groups are sufficiently different to warrant separate consideration. They also clearly influence and overlap with the cognitive dimension described above, an overlap and interdependence noted both by Longino (1990) and by Pickett and colleagues (1994) . Professional norms, in particular, contribute to the objectivity of a scientific community because they govern the interactions among scientists. Of central importance is the existence of recognized avenues for the criticism of evidence, methods, assumptions, and reasoning. Peer review is the most well-known manifestation of this criticism, and a number of respondents drew on this norm to support their argument (table 2). Not only scientists but also interest groups believe that scientific journals are the most important means of communicating scientific results (Lach et al. 2003) . A related norm is the use of impersonal standards as a basis for criticism, and especially the importance of criticizing the idea, not the person who originates or presents it (table 2). The final social norm was the notion that scientific findings are a product of social collaboration. Objectivity thus depends on participation in the collective give-and-take of critical discussion, rather than on detachment (Longino 1990 ).
Paradigmatic norms, by which scientists called on the normative assumptions of their work, were another group of norms to emerge from the Delphi research. All science and its practice are underpinned by paradigms or worldviews, although these are often not recognized or acknowledged. As Kuhn (1962) suggested,"Though most scientists talk easily and well about the particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods" (p. 47).
Contradicting Kuhn (1962) , the Delphi participants reflected on the normative agenda of their work, as well as on the problems and methods characterizing their field. One reflected on how different worldviews (i.e., paradigms) underpinned perceived disagreements between holistic and reductionist ecologists (table 2). Methodological assumptions were also explicitly mentioned, as were different methodological paradigms. Finally, respondents explicitly reflected on the value commitment underpinning their science (Barry and Oelschlaeger 1996) .
The Delphi participants also mentioned broader social norms that reached beyond the scientific community. Their awareness of the broader public and policy context of their work was apparent, as they expressed concerns regarding effective communication with the public and policymakers. This was not surprising, as ecologists have been noted as routinely reflecting on the relationship of their work to the policy process in which it will be used (Waterton et al. 2001 , Lach et al. 2003 and its broader social context (Lubchenco 1998) . Among the concerns the panelists mentioned was the intuitive appeal of species protection to policymakers and to the general public (table 2) . In contrast, basing policy on scientific knowledge of ecosystem processes was mentioned as problematic, because ecosystem processes "are not the sort of things the average punter...can comprehend." Finally, the panelists reflected on the implications of scientific uncertainty for public policy (table 2) .
Because of the iterative nature of the Delphi inquiry, it was possible to evaluate whether and how participants responded to comments by others. Being able to observe and judge these interactions was of great interest, given the importance ascribed by Longino (1990) and Pickett and colleagues (1994) to dialogue as an essential contributor to objectivity. Although the Delphi process was a constructed interaction, it allowed us to observe and report on the extent and nature of interaction regarding current ecological thinking. Table 3 summarizes comments made by ecologists in round 2 of the Delphi inquiry in response to comments made in round 1. ..that the discussion degrades to an exchange of prejudice." "I don't think accusing 'ecosystem science' of immaturity is helpful." Science as a social product from qualified "The comments reflect the individual's state of practitioners knowledge and not the understanding we have of ecosystems."
Paradigmatic norms
Explicit reflection on worldviews "I have some problems with what seems to be a reemergence of the old dispute between the holistic approach of ecosystem ecologists and reductionist species and community ecology. Most of the arguments were about worldviews...." Methodological assumptions and beliefs raised "What humans perceive to be a patchy environment may not be so for a particular species." "Theory without practice is meaningless. Practice without theory is inefficient. Only a sound conceptual understanding will help to develop effective conservation policies." Underpinning paradigmatic beliefs "Like most conservation scientists, I have no doubt that biodiversity should be valued as an end in itself."
Societal concerns
Societal appeal of species protection "[Species protection has] intuitive appeal to policy makers and the public at large." Issues of uncertainty "There is a critical need for many large wild places where we don't mess around (because we don't really know what we are doing most of the time)."
The ecologists clearly responded to the comments and arguments presented by others. The most common response was agreement (38 percent). This occurred when one scientist raised a critical concern with regard to the issue under examination, and the responding scientist agreed with the point being made. Of the remaining forms of interaction, scientists' reinforcement (25 percent) and clarification (18 percent) of their own original explanation in response to others' comments were the next most common. Disagreement (14 percent) was less common, and the participants rarely changed their mind (5 percent).
Scientific objectivity and the use of reasoning
In almost three-quarters (73 percent) of the occasions where reasoning was used, the rationale was grounded empirically, conceptually, or experientially (table 4). Conceptual criticism was invoked in almost half (48 percent) of the total number of comments made as part of presenting arguments. Using methodological value judgements, which are supported by and in turn are used to support conceptual criticisms, is an integral part of the practice of science (Schrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993) . Such judgments help bridge the gap between theories and evidence. Given that ecologists in the Delphi study were asked to provide justification for their views on theories for which there is often limited empirical evidence, they sought to narrow this gap using conceptual analyses.
Although social norms were drawn on less often (27 percent of all comments) than cognitive ones, their appearance in more than a quarter of all comments emphasises the important role that disciplinary paradigms and broader social concerns play in the conduct and objectivity of science (table  4) . This result contradicts the widely held view that scientists have only instrumental concerns, rather than epistemological or reflective ones (Kuhn 1962) . The Delphi participants reflected on the assumptions that underpin their science (paradigmatic norms) as well as on the relationship of science to the broader social context (societal values). These results support the claim that many ecological and environmental scientists are self-reflective regarding their science (Robertson and Hull 2001) .
Conclusions
The reflective, contextual account of objectivity developed in this article has a number of implications for the way we understand the relationship between scientific objectivity, values, and conservation policy. First, the central place of social norms in ecological thinking means that references to values based on these norms do not threaten the integrity, and thus the objectivity, of science. The integrity (or rigor) of the scientific method is upheld when data collection, experimentation, and analysis are governed by the shared standards of science, rather than the ideas of individual scientists. Thus, norms constitute the values by which to judge competing explanations, providing shared standards that control against individual bias (Barry and Oelschlaeger 1996) , as well as imposing constraints on what may reasonably be believed and claimed (Longino 1990) . In this context, identification of and reference to values can enhance, rather than detract from, the objectivity of the ecology available to policymakers.
Second, the study provides insights regarding the role of judgment (i.e., the "fit" between concepts and observable phenomena; Pickett et al. 1994) in ecological thinking, and specifically its role at the interface between ecology research and conservation policymaking. Contextual empiricism holds that the standards of judgment function as values, and it is these values (rather than the data per se) that provide the basis for judging the quality of results and conclusions in science. In this study, these standards were most obvious in the forms of reasoning invoked: judgments were based on empirical evidence, conceptual criticism, and experiential argument. Recognizing this broadening of the objectivity of science to include multiple modes of reasoning encourages conservation policymakers to confidently use information Changed mind "Regarding patterns of suc-5 cession, the mosaic cycle hypothesis may be more appropriate" (round 1). "The mosaic cycle hypothesis is not really such a good example" (round 2). from ecologists generated not only by empirical means but also through other modes. Allen and colleagues (2001) noted that science's contribution to policy is not "proof" or "truth," but good judgment achieved through honest discourse. Third and last, this reflective account of scientific objectivity has particular relevance for understanding the vexed issue of scientific credibility and the contributions of ecologists to conservation policy. In recent years the credibility of ecologists, and of scientists more generally, has been questioned because of their perceived political agenda (Rykiel 2001 ) and the associated claim that values have entered their science. The role of cognitive and social norms (values) in the model of scientific knowledge provided by contextual empiricism provides guidance on how to dispel the myth that science can be "value free," in the crude sense of the term.
Blockstein (2002) defines credibility as "capable of being believed." Scientists consider the quality of their methodology and data, as well as the publication of their work in highquality journals and their reputation among their peers, as the most important factors contributing to credibility (Lach et al. 2003) . Thus, credibility embodies both the cognitive and the social dimensions of contextual empiricism. The credibility of scientists is upheld when there are good reasons to believe that a scientist's judgments are based on standards independent of the scientist (i.e., the values or shared standards of science). They are also upheld when there are good grounds for believing that the authority invested in scientifiic claims could be redeemed in public argument within the relevant scientific community (i.e., that they are the result of critical interaction among scientists).
Thus, scientists can contribute to "reasonable" policy decisions while maintaining their credibility by elaborating the reasons that underpin scientific arguments, which have been the subject of critical discussion amongst their peers. As Lovejoy explains,"As long as we explain the reasoning behind our prescriptions, we do not compromise our scientific credibility" (Lovejoy 1989, cited in Barry and Oelschlaeger 1996, pp. 910-911) .
We believe that the ideal of value neutrality places unrealistic constraints on the contribution science can make to conservation policy. Moreover, the attempt to defend value neutrality effectively closes off progress toward a better understanding of what is worthwhile about science as it is actually practiced. There is good theoretical and empirical justification for understanding science as a social activity in which both the cognitive and the contextual concerns of scientists contribute to scientific objectivity. By emphasizing the place of values in objective science, this approach provides support for a central normative value of the conservation sciences-the conservation of biodiversity.
